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State Law Causes of Action.
Until recently, confusion has been the by-product of federal labor
law preemption.' The federal labor law preemption doctrine was
developed to prevent states from altering the regulatory scheme that
Congress set out in the National Labor Relations Act2 and in the
later Labor Management Relations Act.3 The intent of Congress in
regulating labor relations is to provide a uniform body of laws to
promote industrial peace. 4 Congress purposefully left the federal guide-
lines vague to enable the courts to develop the law as individual cases
required. 5 In Miller v. AT&T Network Systems6 the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeal's rationale suggests that federal labor law preemption
of state law claims is expanding. 7
1. Bryson, A Matter of Wooden Logic: Labor Law Preemption and Individual Rights,
51 TEx. L. Rnv. 1037 (1973) (discussing the background and confusion- surrounding the
preemption doctrine). See also, Cox, Recent Developments in Federal Labor Law, 41 OMo ST.
L.J. 277 (1980) (commenting that there has been more than thirty years of fighting over the
boundary lines defining the realm of exclusive federal control in the field of industrial relations).
2. See infra notes 24-41 and accompanying text (discussing NLRA preemption).
3. See infra notes 42-48 and accompanying text (discussing LMRA preemption).
4. See Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 453 (1957) (quoting
S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., Ist Sess., 17-18). "Statutory recognition of the collective bargaining
agreement as a valid, binding, and enforceable contract is a logical and necessary step. It will
promote a higher degree of responsibility upon the parties to such agreements, and will thereby
promote industrial peace." Id.
5. See Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 459 U.S. 212, 224-225 (1983). The relationships
created by a collective bargaining agreement are to be defined by application of an evolving
federal common law governed by national labor policy. Id.
6. 850 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1988).
7. See infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text (discussing the Farmer exception and its
application to LMRA claims).
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Consistent with Congressional intent, the Supreme Court has de-
termined that state employment laws will be preempted if the deter-
mination of a claim is inextricably intertwined with the consideration
of the terms of a collective bargaining agreement.' A cause of action
that is not inextricably intertwined with the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement is distinguished as a nonnegotiable independent
state law right.9 The Miller court stated that nonnegotiable, inde-
pendent state law rights are not preempted by federal labor law.' 0 A
claim that is substantially dependent upon the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement is inextricably intertwined with the terms of a
collective bargaining agreement. The Miller court developed a three-
pronged test to assist courts in determining whether a cause of action
is inextricably intertwined with the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement.' In Miller, the Ninth Circuit held that an employee's
claim for violation of state anti-discrimination legislation was not
preempted by the collective bargaining agreement. 12 The claim did not
require an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. 3 The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals also held that a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress was preempted by federal regulation
because determination of outrageous conduct, which is required for
the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, may require
interpretation of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.'
4
Part I of this Note examines federal regulations and United States
Supreme Court decisions regarding legislative attempts to regulate
employer/employee relations. Part II summarizes the facts and opin-
ion of the Miller decision. Part III explores the possible legal rami-
fications of the decision in Miller.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Labor Law Preemption
The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution empowers
Congress to regulate labor relations in industries affecting interstate
8. See infra notes 52-62 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court case of
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985)).
9. See Miller, 850 F.2d at 545. See also Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202,
213 (1985).
10. Miller, 850 F.2d at 546. See infra, notes 100-136 and accompanying text (discussing
the Miller holding).
11. Miller, 850 F.2d at 548.
12. Id. at 551.
13. Id. at 548-49.
14. Id. at 550-51.
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commerce. 5 Laws enacted by Congress pursuant to the Commerce
Clause preempt state regulations of industries affecting interstate
commerce in three ways. 6 First, Congress may preempt state law by
expressly stating an intention to occupy the entire field. 17 Second,
congressional intent to preempt state law can be inferred by compre-
hensive legislation that eliminates the possibility of state regulation.
8
Third, preemption occurs when there is an actual conflict between
state and federal law.' 9 That is, state law conflicts with federal law
when compliance with the regulations of both is impossible ° or when
complying with the state law creates a barrier to achieving the full
purpose and objectives of Congress.2'
Congress regulates labor relations through the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) and the Labor Management Relations Act
(LMRA). 22 Each requires a separate analysis. 23 A discussion of pre-
emption under the NLRA and the LMRA follows.
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Clause 3 provides : "[Congress shall have the power]
To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes." Id.
16. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. See generally Herman, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting
Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger Court, 9 INDus. REL. L.J. 623 (1987) (discussing
federal preemption and the Court's approach to concurrent state-federal regulation on the
preemption doctrine).
17. E.g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977). Section 408 of the Federal
Meat Inspection Act, expressly preempted section 12211 of the California Business and Profes-
sions Code, and Article 5 of Title 4 of the California Administrative Code. Id at 530-32.
18. E.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). The 1931 amendments
to the United States Warehouse Act preempted an Illinois public utilities statute, except to the
extent that the federal statute failed to cover the field or provide express exceptions in favor
of state law. Id. at 234 n.12, 235-37.
19. E.g., California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. 683, 689 (1987). Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978,
did not preempt section 12954(b)(2) of the California Government Code because the state statute
was not inconsistent with the purposes of the federal act and did not require the commission
of an unlawful act under Title VII. Id. at 694-95.
20. C.f., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
Dual compliance with California law, certifying the maturity of avocados based upon oil
content, and federal regulations, certifying the maturity of avocados based upon picking date,
size, and weight, was not physically impossible. Id. at 133-34, 139, 143.
21. E.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66-68 (1941). The Pennsylvania Alien Regis-
tration Act of 1939 stood as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full objective of Congress,
spelled out in the Alien Registration Act of 1940. Id. at 72-74.
22. Note, DeTomaso v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.: Preemption of State Tort
Claims by the Railway Labor Act, 19 PAc. L.J. 905 (1988) (discussing labor law preemption
and noting that Congress also regulates labor relations through the Railway Labor Act (RLA)
and the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act (LMRDA)). These
acts are beyond the scope of this Note.
23. See generally Miller, 850 F.2d at 545-46 (determining that different policy factors are
to be considered when there is an employer/employee relationship controlled by a collective
bargaining agreement). See also, Newberry v. Pacific Racing Ass'n, 854 F.2d 1142, 1146 (9th
Cir. 1988) (holding that, without regard to how the claim is framed, the threshold question
will be whether the claim can be resolved by referring to the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement).
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B. Federal Statutory Law
1. NLRA Preemption
Congress enacted the NLRA2 to give employees the right to col-
lective bargaining. The NLRA also gives employees the right to
freedom of association,2 to self organization, 26 and to designate
representatives to negotiate the terms and conditions of employment
in industries affecting interstate commerce.27 The NLRA preempts
state regulation of labor relations in two distinct situations. 28 In the
first situation, developed in San Diego Building Trades Council v.
Garmon,29 the NLRA preempts state regulation where the conduct
the state seeks to prohibit is either arguably prohibited by section 8
of the NLRA30 or arguably protected by section 7 of the NLRA.3 1
The United States Supreme Court established an exception to the
Garmon rule in Farmer v. Carpenters,32 which allows the state juris-
diction in a situation where state law would otherwise be considered
preempted under Garmon.33 Under Farmer, a state-created tort cause
24. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1935). Section 151 states t*at the policy of the United States is to
eliminate the causes of certain interferences with the free flow of commerce and to mitigate
and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the use of collective
bargaining, Id. See also, Comment, NLRA Preemption of State Wrongful Discharge Claims,
34 HAsTINGs L.J. 635 (1983) (discussing NLRA preemption of state laws).
25. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1935). Section 151 states that the right of employees to freedom of
association is protected to further the free flow of interstate commerce. Id.
26, Id. Section 151 states that it is the policy of the United States to encourage the free
flow of commerce by protecting the right of workers to self-organize. Id.
27. Id. Section 151 protects the right of workers to designate representatives of their own
choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and condition of their employment or other
mutual aid or protection as a method of eliminating an obstruction to the flow of interstate
commerce. Id.
28. See generally, Cox, Recent Developments in Federal Labor Law Preemption, 41 Omo
ST, L.J. 277 (1980) (providing an exhaustive analysis of NLRA preemption).
29. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). The NLRA preempted
a state claim by an employer against a union for picketing which was arguably governed by
sections 7 or 8 of the NLRA. Id. at 246.
30. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1935). Section 8 defines acts constituting unfair labor practices. Id.
31. See Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244; 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1935). Section 7 protects the rights of
employees to self-organization and collective bargaining. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 144.
32. Farmer v. Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290, 305 (1977) (recognizing that the state tort claim
law for intentional infliction of emotional distress was not preempted by the NLRA). A union
member brought the claim against his union and its officials, alleging that he was the victim
of a plan of harassment, ridicule, verbal abuse, and hiring discrimination. Id. at 292-293. The
Court reasoned that Garmon did not apply because no provision of the NLRA protected against
conduct which was so outrageous that no person in a civilized society should be expected to
endure it. Id. at 302.
33. Id. at 302.
204
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of action must be either unrelated to employment discrimination, or
integral to the abusive manner in which the discrimination is accom-
plished or threatened.34 The Farmer exception has, by analogy, been
recognized as applicable to LMRA section 301 preemption issues
involving state law emotional distress claims.
5
In the second situation, the NLRA preempts state regulation when
state regulation upsets the balance of power between labor and
management established by the NLRA. 36 This rationale is consistent
vith the congressional intent that the interplay between labor and
management should be controlled by the free play of economic forces
and not regulated by the individual states. 37 There are two different
types of preemption based upon the balance of power.3" The first,
bargaining process preemption, involves state laws that affect parties
currently engaged in collective bargaining agreements. 39 The second,
known as bargaining agreement preemption, results when state regu-
lation interferes with the rights and duties of parties to a collective
bargaining agreement. 40
2. LMRA Preemption
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA)
provides that suits may be brought by labor or management for
34. Id. at 305.
35. See Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1984) cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1099 (1985) (applying Farmer by analogy to a LMRA section 301 claim); Olguin v.
Inspiration Consolidated Copper Co., 740 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1984) (also applying Farmer to
a LMRA section 301 case). See also Newberry, 854 F.2d 1142, 1149 (determining that the
employee's state claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is preempted by section
301). In Newberry, the court explicitly rejected the application of the Former exception in the
context of section 301 preemption analysis. Newberry, at 1148-49.
36. Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1337, 1352-53 (1972), Federal
labor laws provide a framework within which employees can organize themselves and bargain
collectively with employers concerning the terms and conditions of employment. Id. The
framework strikes a balance of protection, prohibition, and laissez faire which would be upset
if states could enforce their views concerning accommodation of the same interests. Id. at 1352.
The legal framework for self-organization and collective bargaining, established by the NLRA,
determines the extent to which the conduct of employers and unions should be regulated. Id.
37. Machinist v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 497 U.S. 132 (1976), (holding
that states are not free to interfere with a union's concerted refusal to work overtime.) Id.
See also Teamsters v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252 (1964) (holding that a state could not interfere
during a labor dispute with a union's attempt to non-coercively persuade customers to boycott
the union's employer).
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violations of a collective bargaining agreement. 4' Congress enacted
section 301 to give courts jurisdiction to enforce collective bargaining
agreements and to compel uniformity in the application of federal
labor law. 42 By enacting section 301, Congress also intended to
stabilize industrial relations by encouraging agreements not to strike.
43
In addition, section 301 permits parties to specify the method of
enforcement of the contract, including mediation and arbitration. 44 If
arbitration is part of the collective bargaining agreement, and the
parties have not expressly designated it as a nonexclusive remedy, the
parties must exhaust arbitration before seeking a judicial remedy.
45
The United States Supreme Court has held that federal labor law
preempts state law in deciding section 301 claims because Congress
intended that doctrines of federal labor law would apply uniformly
over inconsistent local lawi6 Federal law must prevail in cases in-
volving collective bargaining agreements because a different result
would be completely at odds with the federal policy to replace
economic warfare with arbitration. 47
C. Case Law
The Supreme Court distinguishes between an independent nonne-
gotiable state law right and a right negotiated between the parties
that is inextricably intertwined with the terms of the collective bar-
41. Labor Management Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)). Section 301 of the LMRA is
set forth at Title 29 of the United Stated Code, section 185(a) (1947). Section 185(a) states in
relevant part: "Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce . . may be brought in any district
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties." 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1947).
42. Textile Worker's Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957) (holding that
federal laws govern suits brought for breach of a collective bargaining agreement, even if
brought in state court).
43. See id. at 452-458 (citing several Senate and House Reports to support its holding).
44. 29 U.S.C. § 171 (1947) (declaration of the purpose and policy of the NLRA).
45. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652-53 (1965). The LMRA preempted
employee's claim for severance pay because he failed to exhaust the grievance and arbitration
procedures expressed in the collective bargaining agreement before instituting the law suit. Id.
at 659.
46. See Local 174 Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962). The state law claim
was for bad faith breach of contract. Id. at 97. The Court's specific holding was "that in a
case such as this, incompatible doctrines of local law must give way to principles of federal
labor law." Id. at 102. See also, Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 107 S. Ct. 2425, 2427 (1987)
(holding that a suit for breach of an individual employment contract which is independent of
a subsequent collective bargaining agreement is not preempted by section 301).
47. Lucas Flour, 369 U.S. at 105.
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gaining agreement. 41 Where resolution of a dispute requires the inter-
pretation of the collective bargaining agreement, the state law cause
of action is preempted because the state law cause of action is
inextricably intertwined with the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement. 49 If a state court can uphold state claims without inter-
preting the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, then a cause
of action based upon state law is an independent state law right and
does not undermine the purpose of section 301.50 The recognition of
this distinction has developed from the cases that follow.
Before the Supreme Court decision in Allis-Chalmers Corp. v.
Lueck 5 1 section 301 had been applied only to causes of action arising
from breach of a collective bargaining agreement. 2 Lueck extended
the preemption principle for section 301 breach of the collective
bargaining agreement claims to include suits based on tortious con-
duct. 3 Lueck involved a tort claim for bad faith breach of contract .
4
The Court held that where Congress intends to provide an exclusive
remedy for employment contract disputes, a plaintiff cannot rely on
a state tort law remedy to bypass the exclusivity of the federal policy.
55
A cause of action based upon state law is an independent state law
right only if the state court can uphold the claim without interpreting
the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.
5 6
Further, the court stated that section 301 does not allow parties to
a collective bargaining agreement to contract for what is illegal under
state law.57 Rights that are controlled by state law are nonnegotiable
48. See supra notes 100-117 and accompanying text.
49. See supra, notes 100-117 and accompanying text.
50. See Miller, 850 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1988). See also, Newberry, 854 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir.
1988).
51. 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
52. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
53. Lueck, 471 U.S. at 216 (holding that if the duty of either party depends upon the
terms of the collective bargaining agreement in a tort cause of action, the question of duty is
tightly bound to questions of contract interpretation that must be left to federal law).
54. Id. at 203. Roderick Lueck worked for Allis-Chalmers, and his working conditions
were governed by a collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 204. The agreement included by
reference a separately negotiated health and disability plan which was funded by Allis-Chalmers,
but distributed by an insurance company. Id. After suffering a nonoccupational back injury,
Lueck notified Allis-Chalmers of his injury, and followed all other procedures required of him
in accordance with the agreement. Id. at 205. Lueck's claim was approved, but his payments
were periodically cut off without substantial reason. Id. Although the benefits were eventully
paid, Lueck was required to be reexamined by different doctors each time. Id. Lueck filed a
suit for breach of good faith and fair dealings. Id. at 206.
55. Id. at 220.
56. Id. at 213.
57. Id. at 212. See also, Malone v. white Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504-05 (1978)
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and independent of any right established by the collective bargaining
agreement.5 8 Nonnegotiable independent state law rights are not pre-
empted by federal labor law.51
In contrast, if evaluation of the claim is inextricably intertwined
with consideration of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement,
federal labor law preempts the state law claim.6 A state law right is
inextricably intertwined with the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement if it does not exist independently from the collective
bargaining agreement and, as a result, can be negotiated by the
parties.
61
In Lingle v. Norge Division, Magic Chef,62 the United States
Supreme Court further explained the section 301 preemption analysis.
63
Pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, the employee in Lingle
sought reinstatement after being fired for allegedly filing a false
worker's compensation claim.64 The collective bargaining agreement
protected the employee from discharge except for "proper" or "just
cause," and the collective bargaining agreement also called for arbi-
tration of grievances.65 Before the arbitrator ultimately made the
decision to reinstate the employee with back pay, the employee filed
suit in state court alleging that the employer wrongfully discharged
her for pursuing her rights under the state worker's compensation
laws. 6 The employer removed the case to federal court on the basis
of diversity.67 The district court dismissed the employee claim for
retaliatory discharge, reasoning that the claim was inextricably inter-
(concluding that there is little doubt that under the federal labor management relations, an
employer must bargain about wages, hours, and working conditions but there is nothing in
LMRA expressly foreclosing all state regulatory power with respect to issues such as pension
plans that may be the subject of collective bargaining).
58. Lueck, 471 U.S. at 213.
59. Id. at 213.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. 108 S. Ct. 1877 (1988).
63. Id. at 1883.
[E]ven if dispute resolution pursuant to a collective-bargaining agreement, on the one
hand, and state law, on the other, would require addressing precisely the same set of
facts, as long as the state-law claim can be resolved without interpreting the agreement
itself, the claim is 'independent' of the agreement for section 301 pre-emption
purposes.
Id.
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twined with the collective bargaining agreement provision requiring
just cause before the employee could be fired. 8
Further refining the labor law preemption doctrine, the Supreme
Court reversed, holding that section 301 preempts the application of
state law in an action only if applying state law requires the inter-
pretation of a collective bargaining agreement. 69 In Lingle, the state
tort law of retaliatory discharge required the employee to show that
the employer discharged or threatened to discharge the employee and
that the threat or discharge was to discourage the employee from
exercising rights under the state worker's compensation laws.70 Because
neither of these elements required a court to interpret the terms of a
collective bargaining agreement, the Court held that the state law
cause of action was not inextricably intertwined with the collective
bargaining agreement and was not preempted. 71 The Court explained
that a state law is not inextricably intertwined with the collective
bargaining agreement unless the court must interpret the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement to determine whether the state law
has been violated. 72 The Court held that a state law right that can
not be altered by private agreement is nonnegotiable. A nonnegotiable
state law right is not preempted because it can never be included
within the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. 73
A consistent body of law interpreting section 301 preemption analy-
sis is developing. 74 The U.S. Supreme Court has held that federal
labor law preempts state law where employment relationships are
governed by collective bargaining agreements. 5 Lueck extended section
301 preemption to include causes of action based on tort law, drawing
a distinction between claims whose determination is inextricably in-
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1885. "[The] application of state law is pre-empted by section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947 only if such application requires the interpretation of a
collective-bargaining agreement." Id.
70. Id. at 1882.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1883.
73. Id. at 1884. Specifically, the Court said, "[Tihere is nothing novel about recognizing
that substantive rights in the labor relations context can exist without interpreting collective
bargaining agreements." Id. (citing Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S.
728 (1981)). The Court notes that different policy considerations apply when the employee's
claim is based on rights arising out of a statute designed to provide minimum substantive
guarantees to individual employees. Id.
74. See supra notes 52-74 and accompanying text (discussing Lueck and Lingle) and infra
notes 84-136 (discussing Miller). See also Newberry, 854 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1988).
75. Lucas Flour, 369 U.S. at 104 (concluding that Congress intended section 301 to prevail
over inconsistent local rules).
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tertwined with the collective bargaining agreement, and therefore
preempted, and those that are based on nonnegotiable, independent
state law rights. 76 Lingle further refined the preemption analysis by
explicitly holding that claims are inextricably intertwined only if a
cause of action under state law requires interpretation of the collective
bargaining agreement.? By the time Miller v. AT&TNetwork Systems 8
was decided, the concept of "nonnegotiable" was clear.79 The meaning
of "independent state law right," however, remained vague. 80 Con-
fusion occurred because it was unclear how much overlap could exist
between the collective bargaining agreement and state law.81 The Miller
court defined the degree of overlap allowable.82
II. THE CASE
In Miller v. AT&T Network Systems,83 the Ninth Circuit clarified
the factors used in determining whether a state law right is independ-
ent.84 The Ninth Circuit considered Supreme Court precedent and the
policies underlying section 301 preemption to determine whether pre-
emption occurs merely because a collective bargaining agreement
offers relief similar to that available in state court.85 The Ninth Circuit
held that federal law does not preempt a claim based on a state
statute that imposes a mandatory and independent duty on employers
that does not require interpretation of the collective bargaining agree-
ment.8 6 Conversely, federal law will preempt a state law claim that
requires a court to consider the terms of the collective bargaining
76. Lueck, 471 U.S. at 202 (holding that when resolution of a state claim is substantially
dependent on the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, the claim must be treated as a
section 301 claim or dismissed as preempted by federal laws governing labor contracts).
77. Lingle, 108 S. Ct. at 1877 (holding that preemption occurs only if the application of
state law requires the interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement).
78. 850 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1988).
79. Id. at 546. A right is nonnegotiable if the state law does not permit it to be waived,
alienated, or altered by private agreement. Id.
80. Id. at 546 (stating that the concept of a right independent of any right established by
the contract establishes some difficulty).
81. Id. (recognizing that the parties disagreed about the significance of overlap between
the terms of the collective bargaining, agreement and state law).
82. Id. at 548. See infra note 114 and accompanying text (discussing the three-prong test
developed by the Miller court).
83. 850 F.2d at 543.
84. See infra note 112.
85. Miller, 850 F.2d at 543.
86. Id. at 551.
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Daryl Miller worked for AT&T for over twenty years.88 His working
conditions were governed by a collective bargaining agreement, which
included an exclusive grievance procedure that required binding ar-
bitration in the event of a disagreement between labor and manage-
ment.89 Miller had heart problems. 9° Heat affected his heart rate and
caused him to faint in temperatures above ninety degrees.9 Although
AT&T always assigned him to cool climates, in May 1985, AT&T
assigned Miller to work for thirteen weeks in Mesa, Arizona, where
the temperature is frequently over ninety degrees. 92 While on the job
in Mesa, Miller lost consciousness.93 Miller refused to return to work
in Mesa, but was willing to work in cooler climates. 94 Nonetheless,
AT&T fired him.95 Miller filed suit against AT&T in Oregon state
court for discrimination based on physical handicap and for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. 96 AT&T removed the suit to
federal court based on diversity and the presence of a federal question
under section 301 of the LMRA. 97 The district court granted AT&T
a summary judgment based on federal labor law preemption of
Miller's state law claims.
98
B. The Opinion
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's
summary judgment of the discrimination claim and affirmed the
dismissal of the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.19
87. Id. at 551. Whether Miller's reassignment and dismissal were outrageous could have
depended upon the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. Id.











99. Id. at 551.
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The court, relying on Lueck, stated that section 301 preempts state
law when the evaluation of any state claim, whether in tort or in
contract, is inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms
of a collective bargaining agreement. 100 As long as a claim does not
require interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement and eval-
uation of the claim depends upon an independent state law right,
then section 301 does not preempt state law. 01 If the state law
establishes criteria for deciding the issue without looking to the
collective bargaining agreement, the state law right is independent and
therefore not preempted by section 301.1' When the state right is not
preempted, any overlap that might exist between the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement and the state law claim is not rele-
vant.103 This is so because the policy underlying section 301 requires
a uniform interpretation of the terms of labor contracts.'o4 According
to the Miller court, the use of independent state-established criteria
to decide an issue does not therefor conflict with the policies governing
section 301 preemption of causes of action created by state law. 105
1. Defining an Independent State Law Right
Since federal labor law does not preempt an independent state law
right, the Miller court initially evaluated the state law to determine
whether the law is in fact independent. 1°0 According to the Miller
court, if a distinction were not drawn between independent state law
rights and those governed by the collective bargaining agreement,
then mere overlap between a state law created cause of action and
100. Id. at 545 (reaffirming and quoting the holding of Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck, 471 U.S.
202, 213) (even suits based on tort, rather than breach of the collective bargaining agreement,
are governed by federal labor law if their evaluation is inextricably intertwined with consideration
of the terms of a labor contract).
101. Id. at 546 (citing Lueck). See also Paige v. Henry J. Kaiser Co., 826 F.2d 857, 863
(9th Cir. 1987) (holding that a wrongful discharge claim based on violation of a state public
policy is not preempted, because it is a nonnegotiable independent state law right). See also
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 753-58 (1985) (holding that state
minimum labor standards do not interfere with the collective bargaining process and are not
preempted).
102. Miller, 850 F.2d at 546.
103. Id.
104. See id. at 547. See also Lueck, 471 U.S. at 211.
105. Miller, 543 F.2d at 546.
106. Id. at 546. Although the concept of nonnegotiable is clear, the concept of independent
state law right causes difficulty: "A right is nonnegotiable if the state law does not permit it
to be waived, alienated, or altered by private agreement." Id.
212
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one governed by section 301 would trigger preemption. 1' 7 Section 301
would control the substance of agreements that private parties might
reach in a collective bargaining agreement."'8 An employer could
include terms in a collective bargaining agreement similar to state
law rights, effectively exempting the employer from any state labor
standards. 19 The court in Miller asserted that it is contrary to the
policy of section 301 to allow unions and union employers to exempt
themselves from state regulation by merely including similar terms
in the collective bargaining agreement. 110
The Miller court stated that the Supreme Court analyzes the inde-
pendence of a state law right by considering whether the state intended
to have courts rely on the terms of the collective bargaining agreement
when adjudicating alleged violations of state law."' If the state
intended to create terms that the collective bargaining agreement could
not alter, the state law right is not preempted.12 Consistent with the
analysis of independence by the Supreme Court, the Miller court
developed a three-pronged test to determine when section 301 preempts
state law."' First, a court must look to the state statute and determine
whether the collective bargaining agreement contains terms that govern
the action. 114 Second, a court must also consider whether the state
has articulated sufficiently clear standards for determining when the
state law right is violated."15 Third, if the state has articulated suffi-
ciently clear standards, preemption does not occur unless the state
fails to show an intent to prohibit alteration of the right by private
contract.116
107. Id.




112. Id. at 547-48.
113. id. at 548.
In deciding whether a state law is preempted under section 301 ... a court must
consider (1) whether the CBA contains provisions that govern the actions giving rise
to a state claim, and if so, (2) whether the state has articulated a standard sufficiently
clear that the state claim can be evaluated without considering the overlapping
provisions of the CBA, and (3) whether the state has shown an intent not to allow
its prohibition to be altered or removed by private contract. A state law will be
preempted only if the answer to the first question is "yes," and the answer to either
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2. Discrimination Claim
The court applied its three-pronged test and determined that the
Oregon civil rights statute protecting the handicapped1 7 relied on
standards of what constituted discriminatory firings that were inde-
pendent of any standard of reasonable treatment set forth in the
collective bargaining agreement." 8 Even though the collective bargain-
ing agreement contained certain provisions that dictated working
conditions and discharges, the antidiscrimination statute did not rely
upon interpretation of these provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement in determining fault." 9 The court found the state-articulated
standards sufficiently clear so that the claim could be evaluated
without consideration of the terms of the collective bargaining agree-
ment. 20 A claim challenging discharge will not be preempted merely
because certain aspects of the collective bargaining agreement govern
work assignments.' 2'
117. Id. at 548. Oregon Revised Statutes section 659.425 makes it illegal to fire an employee
because of a physical handicap if, with reasonable accommodation by the employer, the employee
could do the work required. OR. REV. STAT. § 659.425 (1989).
118. Miller, 543 F.2d at 548-50. The court first distinguished the following cases cited by
AT&T. (1) Truex v. Barrett Freightlines, Inc., 784 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1985) (emotional distress
claim was preempted because it was based on the employer's sending unjustified warning letters
and excessive supervision of the employee). The court stated that Truex was not relevant because
intentional infliction of emotional distress would require an inquiry into the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement to determine whether Truex's behavior was reasonable (Miller,
543 F.2d at 549). (2) Olguin v. Inspiration Consol. Copper Co., 740 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1984)
(claims for breach of contract, wrongful discharge, wrongful discharge in violation of public
policy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress were preempted). None of the claims
were based on a state tort which was independent of reference to the collective bargaining
agreement (Miller, 543 F.2d at 549). Olguin was no longer a binding precedent since the court
decided Lueck (Miller, 543 F.2d at 549). (3) Magnuson v. Burlington Northern Inc., 576 F.2d
1367 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 930 (1978) (same rationale and outcome as Olquin). (4)
Bale v. General Telephone Co., 795 F.2d 775 (9th Cir. 1986) (state law fraud and misrepresen.
tation actions were preempted because the court would have had to inquire into the terms of
the collective bargaining agreement to see if they differed significantly from the individual
employment contracts the plaintiffs believed they had made). In Miller, the state tort at issue
did not require a comparison of the discharge provisions of the collective bargaining agreement
with the requirements of the statute. The tort only required the employee to show that there
was no probability that he could not have done the job properly or that he could have done
so only by putting himself at risk. Miller, 543 F.2d at 549.
119. Miller, 543 F.2d at 549. The state tort of discrimination based upon handicap does
not require a comparison of the discharge provisions of the collective bargaining agreement
with the requirements of the statute. Id.
120. Id. The discrimination statute only requires a showing that there is no probability that
Miller cannot do the job satisfactorily or that he can do so only at the risk of incapacitating
himself. Id.
121. Id. at 548.
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The court concluded that a handicapped person's right to equal
treatment is nonnegotiable because all citizens are guaranteed this
right; consequently, it cannot be waived.'2 No interpretation of the
terms of the collective bargaining agreement is relevant to determining
whether an employer has violated the antidiscrimination statute. 123
3. Claim of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
The court concluded that Miller's claim for intentional infliction
of emotional distress was preempted because the claim required in-
terpretation of the collective bargaining agreement.' 24 The cause of
action of intentional infliction of emotional distress failed prong one
of the three-pronged test. 25 The Miller court recognized the difficulty
involved in determining whether section 301 preempts a state law
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 126 A claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress requires the employee to
show that the employer's conduct was "outrageous, extremely unrea-
sonable, or in some way inappropriate." 1 27 A showing of outrageous
conduct will often require consideration of the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement, since behavior that would normally be consid-
ered outrageous is not actionable if the parties have agreed to permit
the behavior in the collective bargaining agreement.lu In Miller, the
court concluded that the claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress depended on whether AT&T behaved unreasonably.2 9 AT&T's
reasonableness would depend on whether the behavior violated the
collective bargaining agreement."10
The court found that the claim alleging discrimination was not
preempted because the state law provided for an analysis of that
claim without requiring interpretation of the collective bargaining
122. Id. at 550 (quoting OR. R-v. STAT. § 659.405(2)) ("employment without discrimination
because of handicap ... [is] declared to be the right[U of all people in this state.").
123. Id. at 550.
124. Id. at 551.
125. Id. at 550. "Actions that the collective bargaining agreement permits might be deemed
reasonable in virtue of the fact that the CBA permits them." Id.
126. Id. at 550. "Preemption analysis becomes more complicated, however, when evaluating
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims." Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129.. See supra notes 125-128 and accompanying text.
130. Miller, 543 F.2d at 550.
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agreement."' The claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
was preempted because the court needed to look at the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement to determine whether the behavior of
AT & T was outrageous. 3 2 The first claim arose from a nonnegotiable
independent state law right. 33 The determination of the claim of for
intentional infliction of emotional distress, on the other hand, required
interpretation of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.
3 4
Therefore, the claim of emotional distress was inextricably intertwined
with the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.
3 1
III. LEGAL RAMnFCATIONS
In Miller, the Ninth Circuit has affected future labor law cases in
two ways. First, the court developed a three-pronged test to clear up
the confusion created by distinguishing between a nonnegotiable state
law right and a right where the determination of the outcome is
inextricably intertwined with the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement. 136 A formalistic application of the test will indicate whether
most claims based upon state law are preempted. 37 Labor law attor-
neys should proceed with caution, however, when considering claims
for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
A. Restricted Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims
The state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
in the context of a labor dispute is, after Miller, far more restricted
because of the difficulty in proving that the state-created tort was
intended to prevent contractual arrangements that would alter other-
131. Id. at 550 (finding the rights and duties imposed by the Oregon Legislature to be
mandatory).
132. Id. Determining the appropriateness of the defendant's behavior may require an
examination of the behavior by comparing it to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.
Id.
133. Id. at 550. Oregon's mandatory anti- discrimination statute applied to all citizens. Id.
134. Id. at 551. Actions permitted by the collective bargaining agreement may be deemed
reasonable because the collective bargaining agreement allows them. Id.
135. Id. Even if a state does develop a standard for what constitutes outrageous conduct
without looking to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, there will be little evidence
to determine whether the state tort was intended to preclude collective bargaining agreement
provisions that would "otherwise give rise to an emotional distress claim." Id.
136. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
137. Miller, 850 F.2d at 548-550. See supra notes 114-117 and accompanying text.
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wise outrageous behavior.1 8 This is true even if the state tort law was
developed so as to do away with the need to interpret the collective
bargaining agreement. 13 9 Suppose, for example, that a dispute con-
cerning the charge of wrongful discharge goes to arbitration in ac-
cordance with the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, and
the arbitrator determines that the employee was released for just cause
within the meaning of the collective bargaining agreement. A legiti-
mate claim by the employee of intentional infliction of emotional
distress cannot be maintained since the employer's action was reason-
able under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.
The collective bargaining agreement may permit behavior that
would be shocking under state tort law but for the fact that the parties
agreed to it in the labor contract. 14 There will rarely be evidence that
the state law cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress was intended to preclude contractual agreements that otherwise
allow for behavior beyond the "farthest reaches of socially tolerable
behavior" without referring to the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement to determine the boundaries of the parties' relationship.
141
It will not matter whether an employee or an employer wins in
arbitration. If there is a collective bargaining agreement outlining
grievance procedures, then any state law cause of action that may
substantially rely upon the terms of the collective bargaining agreement
will be preempted.
B. Expanding Preemption
Second, the court in Miller broadened the arena in which preemp-
tion occurs. The Farmer exception to the Garmon rule had been
applied by analogy to section 301 cases. 42 Farmer, however, originated
138. Miller, 543 F.2d at 550 (stating that "both independence and mandatoriness will be
difficult to find" when evaluating a state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress). "Such claims may not be preempted if the particular offending behavior has been
explicitly prohibited by mandatory statute or judicial decree, and the state holds violation of
that rule in all circumstances sufficiently outrageous to support an emotional distress claim."
Id. at 550 n.5.
139. See Id. See also Newberry, 854 F.2d at 1149 (explaining that Lueck controls preemption
analysis in section 301 cases).
140. Miller, 850 F.2d at 551. "The farthest reaches of socially tolerable behavior is not an
independent, nonnegotiable standard of behavior." Id.
141. Id. at 551. The outrageousness of the behavior may depend on whether the behavior
violated the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. Id.
142. Newberry, 854 F.2d at 1148 (stating that earlier cases from the 9th Circuit assumed
that Farmer was relevant to section 301 cases). See supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text.
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in the context of the NLRA, and not in the context of the LMRA. 43
The court in Miller implied that the Farmer exception no longer
applies to LMRA cases. 44 The underlying policy for expanding federal
labor law preemption is a recognition of the benefit of creating a




Congress, by enacting the NLRA and the LMRA intended to have
industrial relations governed by a uniform body of laws. To achieve
this purpose in the realm of collective bargaining agreements, Congress
purposely left it up to the courts to determine when the LMRA would
preempt state law causes of action. Acting in conformity with the
intent of Congress, the Supreme Court in Lueck determined that
section 301 of the LMRA preempts state law causes of action not
only for breach of the collective bargaining agreement, but also for
suits brought in tort.'4 The Court recognized, however, that not all
state regulation of labor relations is to be preempted.' 47 The Court
drew a distinction between nonnegotiable state law rights and those
whose determination is inextricably intertwined with the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement. 48 A nonnegotiable state law right is
not preempted by section 301.' 49 According to the holding of the
Court in Lingle, a state law right is preempted by section 301 if
determination of whether the state law right has been violated requires
interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement; if it does, it is
inextricably intertwined with the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement and preempted by section 301.150
The Miller opinion applied Lueck and Lingle faithfully. Miller
interpreted the meaning of the terms "nonnegotiable independent
143. Farmer, 430 U.S. 290 (1977).
144. See Miller, 850 F.2d 543. See also, Newberry, 854 F.2d at 1149 (making explicit what
was inferred in Miller, Lueck, not Farmer, controls preemption by section 301).
145. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
146. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
147. Id. at 220. The full scope of federal preemption in the labor contract context must be
fleshed out on a case by case basis. Id.
148. Id. at 210. State rules that purport to define the meaning and scope of terms in a
collective bargaining agreement are preempted. Id.
149. Id. at 212. Section 301 does not allow the parties to a labor contract to contract for
what is clearly illegal under state law. Id.
150. Lingle, 108 S. Ct. at 1885.
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state law right" and "inextricably intertwined" and created a test to
determine when section 301 of the LMRA will preempt state law.
The Miller court interpreted the distinction between nonnegotiable
state law rights and those inextricably intertwined with the terms of
the collective bargaining agreement as broadening federal labor law
preemption. Specifically, the court in Miller recognized the difficulty
of finding independence of a state law cause of action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. In broadening the preemption analysis,
the court rejects the application of Farmer to section 301 preemption
analysis. Although the Ninth Circuit approach may appear confusing,
it is fully consistent with the overriding policy which has guided the
development of labor law preemption: to maintain a uniform body
of laws.
Robert E. Oakes

